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ABSTRACT 
This article traces the historical usages of the term capital and the explosion of different types 
of supposed ‘capital’ in the twentieth century, including ‘human capital’ and ‘social capital’. 
In medieval and early modern times, capital meant money investable or invested in business. 
This meaning persists in business circles today. In contrast, Adam Smith treated physical 
assets, machines and people as ‘capital’ and this different usage has dominated economics 
since. The pre-Smithian meaning referred to money or other saleable assets that could be used 
as collateral. This article questions the change in meaning by economists and sociologists, and 
highlights the importance of collateralisable property for capitalism. ‘Human capital’ can only 
be collateral if the humans involved are slaves. ‘Social capital’ can never be used as collateral 
and it is not even owned. These important issues are masked by the broadened notion of 
‘capital’. Given the conceptual problems involved, economists and sociologists should 
consider returning to the pre-Smithian and surviving business usage of the term.   
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Economists and sociologists have changed its meaning – 
Should it be changed back? 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
 
‘The question is’, said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.’ 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (1871) 
How complete the divorce is between the experience of daily life and the 
teaching of the economists can best be seen by reading, for example, 
Marshall's chapter on capital, with its complicated divisions into national 
capital, social capital, personal capital, etc.. Every banker and every 
commercial man knows that there is only one kind of capital, and that is 
money. Every commercial and financial transaction is based on the truth 
of this proposition, every balance sheet is made out in this well-
established fact. And yet every economist bases his teaching on the 
hypothesis that capital is not money. 
Alfred Mitchell Innes (1914) 
 
 
It might reasonably be presumed that to understand capitalism we must understand capital.1 
But economists have long shifted the meaning of the word, and gradually widened its 
application. Sociologists have also contributed to its enlargement of meaning. No longer does 
it have any connection with any specific mode of production. In some of its conjunctions it 
inspires ambitious empirical research programmes, which unfortunately exhibit a congenital 
difficulty agreeing on what it is that they are trying to measure. We must consider what 
happened, and appraise the consequences for our understanding.  
                                                 
1 The author thanks Rutger Claassen, Frank Currie, Anne-Claire Hoyng, Klaus Nielsen, Ugo Pagano, Richard 
Van Den Berg, and four anonymous referees for their responses to an earlier draft. Although some of them 
questioned the desirability of a return to the original definition, their comments were very useful. In quotations 
herein, all emphases are in the original texts. 
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It would be important to explain why the term changed its meaning, but that is a huge task, 
far beyond the scope of this paper. As well as the changing socio-economic context, such an 
account would have to examine the changes within, and rivalry between, the disciplines of 
economics and sociology. Instead, the main task of the paper is to note some key changes and 
extensions of meaning, and to consider their analytic implications.  
The first section of this essay locates important milestones in the historical evolution of the 
word capital. The second section addresses the broadening of the term in the notion of ‘human 
capital’. The third section lists some other extensions of the capital concept. The fourth 
section addresses ‘social capital’ at length. The fifth section draws the threads together and 
compares the merits and demerits of different definitions.  
1. A brief history of the c-word  
In the beginning, capital referred to head-counts of cattle. But in ancient Greece and Rome the 
word took a broader meaning, often referring to wealth in general. But there is no need for the 
c-word if the w-word means the same. Over eight hundred years ago the word capital 
acquired a more specific meaning, which has endured (except within economics and 
sociology) to this day.  
Fernand Braudel (1982, pp. 232-33) pointed out in his Civilization and Capitalism that the 
word capitale was in use in Italy in 1211 and is found from 1283 ‘in the sense of the capital 
assets of a trading firm’. The word gradually came to mean the ‘money capital of a firm or of 
a merchant’ and spread through Western Europe.  
In England in the sixteenth century the word retained its Italian and monetary meaning and 
was used by business firms in their accounting practices. Hence in 1569 one James Peele 
wrote on ‘the art of Italian merchants accounts’, described ‘an inventorie’ of ‘all thinges … 
apperteyninge to trade of merchaundise’, and urged a businessman to ‘accompte for his 
proper stocke or capitall’ (Cannan 1921, p. 471). Irving Fisher (1904, p. 392) quoted an 
Italian source of 1612 that had capital as a principal advanced as a quantity of money and a 
French source of 1694 that referred to capital as the principal of a debt. In England in 1635 
Richard Dafforne in a book on accounting instructed his readers to ‘booke the capitall which 
each partner of a joint company promiseth to bring in’ (Cannan 1921, p. 471). The 1697 Bank 
of England Act of Parliament speaks of the ‘common’ capital and ‘principal’ stock of the 
company and ‘the said capital stock’ (Cannan 1921, p. 473).  
Fisher (1904, p. 393) cited English sources of 1730, 1750 and 1759 that all define capital as 
a sum of money advanced by a trading company or ‘the money which a merchant first brings 
into trade on his own account’. According to Edwin Cannan (1921, p. 475) the following 
entry appears in 1751 in Postlethwayt’s influential Universal Dictionary of Trade and 
Commerce: 
CAPITAL, amongst merchants, bankers, and traders, signifies the sum of money which 
individuals bring to make up the common stock of a partnership when it is first formed. It 
is also said of the stock which a merchant at first puts into trade, for his account. It 
signifies likewise the fund of a trading company or corporation, in which sense the word 
stock is generally added to it.  
Accordingly, from Italy from the thirteenth century to Britain in the eighteenth, the word 
capital was mostly used in the sense of the money advanced by owners or shareholders to 
establish a business.  
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But we can also find a second meaning, referring to a stock of goods, or even wealth in 
general. Frank Fetter (1930, p. 187) pointed out that Randle Cotgrave, in his Dictionarie in 
1611 defined capital as ‘wealth, worth; a stocke, a man’s principall, or chiefe, substance’. 
Fetter commented: ‘Here the idea of ‘worth’, implying a valuation, is thoroughly mixed with 
that of substance, no doubt in the sense of material things in possession. ‘Capital’ thus used is 
a superfluous and confusing synonym of wealth, goods and stock’. But the evidence suggests 
that as late as the eighteenth century the monetary meaning dominated its secondary use as a 
‘superfluous and confusing’ synonym of wealth.  
Then entered Adam Smith, and henceforth among economists the word changed its 
meaning. It is not necessary here to go into the influences upon Smith, including Anne-
Robert-Jacques Turgot and the Physiocrats. Crucially his vision of rising capitalism was of 
the amassment of things, produced and rearranged by labour. The opening preoccupation of 
The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations is the division of labour and the increasing 
productivity of physical things. The ‘nature’ of wealth was physical stuff, typically produced 
by other stuff. Money did not fit readily into this scheme, unless it was treated as silver or 
gold, so that it too became a thing with intrinsic value, produced by labour. Capital became 
physical stuff. Smith wrote in several places in this book of ‘stock’ and ‘capital stock’ and he 
applied these terms to both money and goods. Eventually he considered these terms in more 
depth. For Smith (1976, p. 282) ‘fixed capital, of which the characteristic is, that it affords a 
revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters’ included machines, buildings, land 
and ‘the acquired and useful abilities’ of individuals. Smith continued:  
The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his education, 
study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and 
realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do 
they likewise that of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a 
workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which 
facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that 
expense with a profit. 
Although Smith did not use the term ‘human capital’, this is a major source of the idea that 
the term capital applies to people as well as things. By extending the notion of capital to 
people and their labour, Smith changed its meaning to a productive resource, rather than 
money or money-values. Cannan (1921, p. 480) commented on the above words from Smith: 
This indicates a very serious departure from the conception of capital which had hitherto 
prevailed. Instead of making the capital a sum of money which is to be invested, or which 
has been invested in certain things, Smith makes it the things themselves. Instead of being 
a sum of money expended on the acquisition of stock, it is part of the stock itself. But the 
change is not pointed out to the reader in any way … 
For economics this shift of meaning was seminal. The term capital acquired the twin and 
often mutually confused meanings of money and productive goods, but often with the accent 
on the latter. Smith also hinted that labour power was also a form of capital, but that particular 
extension did not become widespread until the twentieth century.  
Although most economists followed Smith and relegated the monetary meaning, they still 
could not agree on the precise definition of capital. Nassau W. Senior (1836, p. 156) wrote: 
‘Economists are agreed that whatever gives a profit is properly termed capital.’ But the 
agreement was illusory. John Stuart Mill (1848, ch. 3) defined capital as the ‘accumulated 
stock of the produce of labour’. With Senior, capital produces profit, but with Mill it is 
anything that is produced and accumulated.  
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Marx had the insight that capitalism was a historically specific system, where money had 
moved from a medium for the exchange of commodities (C–M–C) to the supreme goal of 
production and exchange (M–C–M'), where M' is greater than M. Money capital thus became 
the driving force of the system. But otherwise Marx did not try to reverse Smith’s shift to a 
non-monetary meaning. He argued that the means of production become capital when they 
become means of exploitation of the workers. He wanted capital to refer to the central forms 
and driving processes in capitalism, including class exploitation and the production of value. 
Hence Marx (1976a, p. 933) quipped that ‘capital is not a thing, but a social relation between 
persons, established by the instrumentality of things.’ Similarly, in his chapter criticizing ‘the 
trinity formula’ of ‘capital, land, labour’ in classical economics, Marx (1981, p. 953) argued: 
But capital is not a thing, it is a definite relation of production pertaining to a particular 
historical social formation, which simply takes the form of a thing and gives this thing a 
specific social character. Capital is not the sum of the material and produced means of 
production. Capital … is the means of production monopolised by a particular section of 
society, the products and conditions of activity of labour-power … 
Marx’s addition of social relations reinstated capital as a historically specific phenomenon. 
But this remained remote from the everyday meaning of capital as money invested in 
production. Marx was still tied to the classical vision of production in terms of physical 
entities and forces. Consequently, his discourse switched to and fro among relational, 
processual, physical and other incompatible meanings (Ingham 2004, pp. 61-3). Following 
earlier authors, he divided capital into ‘fixed’ and ‘variable’ forms, referring respectively to 
tangible productive resources such as machines, and to labour power.  
Within the German historical school there were very different usages of the term. Wilhelm 
Roscher (1843) followed Smith and Senior and described all productive resources as Kapital. 
Karl Knies (1885, pp. 40-42) narrowed the definition to ‘economic goods’. By contrast, 
Werner Sombart (1902, vol. 2, p. 129) recognized that capital is a phenomenon found in 
specific historical epochs and returned to its pre-Smithian meaning by defining it as ‘the sum 
of exchange value which serves as the working basis of a capitalist enterprise’. But this was 
an exceptional statement.  
Max Weber’s position was similar to that of Sombart. In his Economy and Society – which 
was unpublished in his lifetime – Weber (1968, vol. 1, p. 91) wrote that ‘“Capital” is the 
money value of the means of profit-making available to the enterprise at the balancing of the 
books’. Although Weber (1968, vol. 1, p. 94) also used the term ‘capital goods’, he saw them 
as ‘all such goods as are administrated on the basis of capital accounting.’ For Weber, 
‘capital’ was expressed in monetary units in an era of rational accounting on the basis of 
monetary measurement.   
The Austrian school economist Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk devoted an entire work to capital. 
For him, the problem of defining capital was intimately connected with the explanation of the 
interest rate and its magnitude. For Böhm-Bawerk (1890, p. 6)  
capital signifies a complex of produced means of acquisition – that is, a complex of goods 
that originate in a previous process of production, and are destined, not for immediate 
consumption, but to serve as means of acquiring further goods.  
There is no mention of money here. The focus is on physical goods that are used to produce 
more goods. Having demoted money, Böhm-Bawerk established a productivity theory of 
interest.  
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Worried about the conflation of money with material products, John Bates Clark (1888) 
made a distinction between ‘pure capital’ and ‘capital goods’. The latter term became widely 
used, but ‘pure capital’ referred rather vaguely to the value of the goods termed ‘capital’, or 
the fund of value somehow resident in them, and was not widely adopted. Despite Clark’s 
attempts, ‘capital’ took a double meaning of money or goods. Hence Irving Fisher (1896, 
1897, 1904, 1906) influentially and more broadly defining capital as any ‘material’ entity that 
produces a flow of income over time. Fisher, in contrast to Clark, regarded people as capital. 
He made explicit what was implicit in Smith’s Wealth of Nations. 
This broadened notion of capital met objections. In a work that appeared originally in 1894, 
John A. Hobson (1926, p. 26) noted that economists disputed the meaning of capital, while 
‘ignoring the clear and fairly constant meaning the term actually possesses in the business 
world around them.’ Hobson pointed out that in the ‘business world’ capital meant ‘money or 
the control of money, sometimes called credit’ or ‘all forms of marketable matter which 
embody labour.’2 
Thorstein Veblen (1892, 1908a, 1908b, 1908c, 1908d) criticised Clark, Böhm-Bawerk and 
Irving Fisher. Echoing Marx, Veblen pointed to the failures of economists to associate capital 
specifically with the modern mode of production. But diverging from Marx and many others, 
Veblen argued that the sources of wealth were not simply material instruments combined with 
labour, but ‘intangible assets’ or ‘immaterial wealth’ including the common know-how in the 
community. In his critique of Clark, Veblen (1908a, pp. 162-3) wrote:  
In current usage, in the business community, ‘capital’ is a pecuniary concept, of course, 
and is not definable in mechanical terms; but Mr. Clark, true to the hedonistic taxonomy, 
sticks by the test of mechanical demarcation and draws the lines of his category on 
physical grounds; whereby it happens that any pecuniary conception of capital is out of 
the question. Intangible assets, or immaterial wealth, have no place in the theory … 
[Instead there is a] conception of capital, as a physically ‘abiding entity’ constituted by 
the succession of productive goods that make up the industrial equipment … 
Veblen underlined the everyday business definition of capital. He also highlighted the 
incongruity between the notion of capital as a physical substance and the real-world cycles of 
boom and bust, driven by market sentiment and leading to the expansion and destruction of 
financial assets. Veblen (1908a, pp. 164-6) noted the admission by economists that business 
crises ‘destroy capital in part’. He continued:  
The destruction in question is a matter of values; that is to say, a lowering of valuation, 
not in any appreciable degree a destruction of material goods. Taken as a physical 
aggregate, capital does not appreciably decrease through business disasters, but, taken as 
a fact of ownership and counted in standard units of value, it decreases. … It would 
accordingly appear that the substantial core of all capital is immaterial wealth, and that 
the material objects which are formally the subject of the capitalist’s ownership are, by 
comparison, a transient and adventitious matter. 
Veblen (1908b, p. 117) thus concluded:  
The failure of classical theory to give an intelligent account of credit and crises is in great 
part due to the habitual refusal of economists to recognize intangible assets, and Mr. 
                                                 
2 The words ‘which embody labour’ are overly restrictive. If someone purchases an uncultivated wilderness and 
uses this asset as collateral, then the wilderness could be regarded as capital – in business parlance – although it 
is largely untouched by labour.  
 - 6 - 
Fisher’s argument is, in effect, an accentuation of this ancient infirmity of the classical 
theory.  
But Veblen’s critique was inhibited by his own conception of production as a largely 
technical and physical engineering process, resting ‘chiefly on the physical conditions of 
human life’ that should be understood in terms of ‘Physics and the other material sciences’ 
(Veblen 1901a, p. 205), where the structures of human organization and motivation were 
downplayed. He thus retained part of the reigning physical story. Instead of denying the 
notion of capital as material, he added immaterial assets. But can capital be understood as a 
mixture of the two types of asset – the material and immaterial?3  
Despite the efforts of economists to the contrary, elsewhere in business and financial circles 
the term capital retained its monetary meaning, throughout the nineteenth century and 
beyond.4 For example, the relevant entry in James A. H. Murray’s (1893, p. 98) New English 
Dictionary on Historical Principles, saw ‘capital’ as ‘pertaining to the original funds of a 
trader, company, or corporation; principal; hence, serving as a basis for financial and other 
operations.’ Similarly, Alfred Mitchell Innes (1914, p. 152) noted: ‘Every banker and every 
commercial man knows that there is only one kind of capital, and that is money.’ Alfred 
Marshall (1920, pp. 66-7) made a similar acknowledgement in his Principles: 
the language of the market-place commonly regards a man’s capital as that part of his 
wealth which he devotes to acquiring an income in the form of money; … This definition 
of capital from the business point of view is firmly established in ordinary usage … 
But Marshall (1920, p. 76) went on to redefine capital ‘in harmony with the common practice 
of economists’, which for him meant the trinity of land, labour and capital as factors of 
production. In the end, Marshall rejected the business usage; he stood with Smith and 
subsequent economists, rather than with the heterodox minority of economist critics. 
Moving further into the twentieth century, the American economist Fetter – who was 
influenced by both Austrian economics and the original institutionalism – was one of the few 
to attempt to restore an earlier meaning. Fetter (1927, p. 156) saw the danger in the widening 
of the capital concept:  
Capital is essentially an individual acquisitive, financial, investment ownership concept. It 
is not coextensive with wealth as physical objects, but rather with legal rights as claims to 
uses and incomes. It is or should be a concept relating unequivocally to private property 
and to the existing price system.  
Fetter (1930, p. 190) insisted that capital is both a monetary and a historically specific 
phenomenon: 
Capital is defined as a conception of individual riches having real meaning only within 
the price system and the market where it originated, and developing with the spread of the 
financial calculus in business practice.  
                                                 
3 Joan Robinson (1979) rediscovered Veblen’s critique of Clark’s capital concept during the Cambridge capital 
controversies, which had been largely stimulated by the work of Sraffa (1960). Following Veblen, the 
Cambridge (UK) side of the debate insisted that capital as finance has been confused with capital goods. But 
other important features of Veblen’s argument were overlooked.  
4 Even to this day, numerous dictionaries highlight the monetary and business meaning. For example, the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines capital as ‘wealth in the form of money or other assets owned by a person or 
organization or available for a purpose such as starting a company or investing.’ 
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Within a few years another major capital debate had erupted within economics, this time 
between Friedrich A. Hayek (1934, 1935b, 1936) and Frank H. Knight (1934, 1935). Like J. 
B. Clark, Knight saw capital a fund of value which is malleable, and perpetual. For him, the 
rate of interest was determined entirely by the marginal productivity of capital goods, without 
reference to time preference. In contrast, Hayek followed Böhm-Bawerk and emphasized the 
heterogeneity of different capital investments with respect to their ‘roundaboutness’ and 
period of production. But Hayek rejected Böhm-Bawerk’s subsistence-fund theory of the 
interest rate (Valiente 1980, Ahmad 1991, Cohen 2003).  
What are interesting in this debate are not only the points of disagreement but also those of 
communality. Both Hayek and Knight argued within an equilibrium framework, while also 
hinting at its limitations. Neither saw capital as money. Both attempted to force round matters 
of finance were forced into the square holes of the technical structure of production. By 
contrast, Joseph A. Schumpeter (1954, pp. 322-3) insisted that the term capital should be 
applied to financial assets alone:5 
The word Capital had been part of legal and business terminology long before economists 
found employment for it. With the Roman jurists and their successors, it denoted the 
‘principal’ of a loan as distinguished from interest and other accessory claims of the 
lender. In obvious relation with this, it later came to denote the sums of money or their 
equivalents brought by partners into a partnership or company, the sum total of a firm’s 
assets, and the like. Thus the concept was essentially monetary, meaning either actual 
money, or claims to money, or some goods evaluated in money. ... What a mass of 
confused, futile, and downright silly controversies it would have saved us, if economists 
had had the sense to stick to those monetary and accounting meanings of the term instead 
of trying to ‘deepen’ them!  
This advice was not followed by economists. Notably, the Cambridge capital controversy of 
the 1960s and 1970s avoided the issue raised by Schumpeter and others. Both sides of the 
Cambridge controversy treated capital as physical rather than essentially financial, with 
Cambridge UK insisting on the heterogeneity of capital goods and the problem of their 
measurement and aggregation (Sraffa 1960, Harcourt 1972, Robinson 1979, Cohen and 
Harcourt 2003). The rate of profit was conflated with the rate of interest. Money and finance 
were much left out of the picture.  
If Schumpeter, preceded by Hobson, Sombart, Weber, Mitchell Innes, and Fetter, are 
broadly right on this question, then economists have subverted a central concept. Their 
inability to deal adequately with capital derives in part from a social ontology that focused on 
the possession of physical objects, and in part from a reluctance to treat a core notion such as 
capital as historically specific, under the illusion that economics is the study of universal and 
ahistorical laws (Hodgson 2001). The German historical school critiqued ahistorical analyses. 
It was no accident that Sombart was a member of this school, and Schumpeter was deeply 
influenced by them (Streissler 1994, Ebner 2000, Michaelides and Milios 2009). Their key 
ideas were also available to Mitchell Innes and Fetter.  
What then is capital? There are two prominent options. We could follow the post-Smith 
trend in economics and sociology and regard capital as any relatively durable thing or 
attribute that leads to the satisfaction of wants. According to this definition, capital has existed 
                                                 
5 Along the same lines, Schumpeter (1956, p. 174) wrote in 1917: “the capital market is the same as the 
phenomenon that practice describes as the money market. There is no other capital market.” 
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since the dawn of humanity, and it is not confined to any specific mode of production. 
Marxism offers a variant on this first definition by narrowing capital to productive factors 
under circumstances where workers are employees and do not own the material means of 
production.  
A second option is to follow Hobson, Sombart, Weber, Mitchell Innes, Fetter, and 
Schumpeter and return to the meaning of capital that emerged in Europe by the thirteenth 
century in the context of trading and investment. Capital is then defined as a fund of money to 
be invested by a person or firm in some enterprise. It can also refer to the money-value of 
tangible and intangible assets owned by the person or firm, which in principle can be used as 
collateral, and serve to buy or hire resources to produce goods or services for commodity 
exchange. In both cases, capital is measured as an amount of money. If it refers to the money 
value of other owned assets, then these can be used as collateral for money loans. Capital is 
money, or the realizable money-value of owned and collateralisable property. Contrary to 
Smith and his successors, neither wages nor wage labour can be capital – neither can act as 
collateral. Capital involves social relations, and social institutions such as money and private 
property, but contrary to Marx, it does not necessarily involve the employment of workers by 
capitalists.  
2. Can humans be capital? 
We have seen that Smith regarded labour and skill as forms of capital, but he did not use the 
term ‘human capital’. When did the idea of labour skills as capital become prevalent and 
when did the term ‘human capital’ emerge? We have to consider both the history of the term 
and the history of the ideas behind it.6 
The first appearance of the term ‘human capital’ long pre-dates its twentieth-century 
exponents. Sir William Cornwallis Harris (1807-1848) was an officer in the army of the East 
India Company. He travelled in Africa and India and was a prolific writer. He wrote a ‘Report 
to the Secretary of the Bombay Government’ on the African slave-trade (Harris 1842). 
Extracts from this report were published on December 2, 1844 in the British pro-development 
and anti-slavery journal The Friend of the Africans. In his report Harris addressed ‘African 
commerce’ and pointed to the underdevelopment of its industry and manufactures. Harris 
continued: ‘Few, if any, of the commodities which she barters with other countries for the 
rude and limited supplies that she seeks are the production of human capital, labour, or 
industry.’ This is the first known use of the term ‘human capital’. Its precise meaning here is 
unclear, particularly as the terms ‘human capital’ and ‘labour’ are adjacent. Ruling out the 
possibility of needless repetition by an accomplished writer, this suggests that for Harris these 
terms did not mean the same thing. Especially given the context, it is possible that by ‘human 
capital’ Harris meant slaves.  
There is a reason for this interpretation. As pointed out above, among non-economists for 
centuries capital has had the meaning of monetary investment in fixed assets that are 
purchased and used in, but unconsumed by, production. This commonplace usage excludes 
raw materials and hired labour. But a slave, like a machine, is retained by its owner. In this 
sense, a slave – but not a wage labourer – can be capital. But when 38 years later the term 
‘human capital’ appeared again, there was no allusion to slavery (Donisthorpe 1880, p. 28). 
Nevertheless, five years earlier, the Scottish-born merchant, historian, statistician and 
                                                 
6 Klaes (2001) made a strong argument in favour of investigations into the history of the use of key terms in 
discourse, in addition to the history of the ideas that such terms may represent. 
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Australian politician William Westgarth (1875, pp. 23, 64) had written in his pamphlet on the 
Science of Capital and Money: 
labour can be wealth or capital … only when it is bonded, and thus rendered a definite 
subject of exchangeable value. It is in this sense that a slave is true capital, but not a free 
man. Labour brings wealth into being, but excepting in any of the various bonded forms I 
shall have occasion to allude to, it is not itself wealth. … A slave is a definite marketable 
subject, and is capital, but a free agent is not.  
Westgarth (1875, p. 65) was not supporting slavery but protesting against the application of 
the term capital to ‘the mere labour possibility or labour capacity of a country, or of any of its 
people.’ Later in this section I shall argue that the issue of slavery is relevant in the discussion 
of the notion of human capital, but for reasons that are different from and more robust than 
those provided by Westgarth.7  
The term ‘human capital’ makes its first appearance in a prominent journal of economics in 
an article by Irving Fisher (1897), who proposed that all factors of production, including 
machines, land and labour, should be described as capital. Veblen (1908b, p. 115) was one of 
the few to object to this extension of meaning: 
A serviceable definition of capital, one that shall answer to the concept as it is found in 
practice in the habits of thought of business men, will not include persons. … And as for a 
business man’s capitalizing other persons, the law does not allow it, even in the form of 
peonage.  
Veblen thus alluded to the illegality of enslavement, implicit in the treatment of persons as 
capital. But otherwise the term ‘human capital’ met little opposition and became 
commonplace after the seminal works of Theodore W. Schultz (1960, 1971) and Gary Becker 
(1964). ‘Human capital’ therein meant a factor of production, among others. Its magnitude 
was enhanced by education and training. A key objective for economists was to estimate its 
value so that quantities of this labour-stuff could be put into a production function alongside 
other inputs, in order to ‘explain’ the magnitude of output, the contribution of education, the 
demand for education, and so on.8 
We now turn from the history of the term to the lineage some of the key ideas behind it, 
particularly as developed in the research program of Schultz and Becker. An article by B. F. 
Kiker (1966) considered these precedents. He explained that in economics there have long 
been broadly two approaches to the valuation of human beings. One is to estimate the cost of 
producing an individual in terms of care, nutrition and so on. The other is to evaluate an 
individual in terms of all expected future earnings. As Kiker documented, these ideas have a 
long history.  
Sir William Petty (1690) devised a method of calculating the money value of human 
beings, and hence the cost of life lost through diseases and wars. His method was to estimate 
the future wage bill in perpetuity at the market interest rate. But he did not describe labour as 
capital. His objectives were different from those of Schultz and Becker. Petty wished to 
                                                 
7 Westgarth (1875, p. 28) wrote: ‘We must deal in economics with definite things. The unengaged labour power 
of a free agent is altogether an indefinite quantity, and quite outside of economic science.’ But when labour 
became bonded by agreement or enslavement then it became ‘a definite subject to deal with.’ He adopted a 
physical or mechanistic view of money and denied that credit was money or capital.   
8 Note the classic critical review of this research program by Blaug (1976).  
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determine the magnitude national wealth, estimate the benefits of employing idle labour, and 
provide a framework for establishing just and efficient taxation.  
Kiker (1966, p. 482) then addressed what he described as ‘the first truly scientific 
procedure’ for estimating human capital. This he found in the work of William Farr (1853), 
who was primarily concerned with the matter of taxation. Farr argued that the present value of 
a person’s net future earnings, which he defined as earnings less living expenses, represented 
wealth in the same way as did physical property and should be similarly taxed.  This method 
of capitalizing a future net income flow was later developed and enshrined within economics 
by Fisher (1907). But unlike Fisher, Farr did not use the term ‘human capital’ and did not 
imply that labour as capital. Instead, for him ‘the property inherent in a man’ is ‘Inherent 
Property’ (Farr 1853, p. 2). Kiker (ibid.) then remarked:  
Farr’s work … suggested that since human beings are productive they should be regarded 
and taxed as capital. Since this would oblige people to pay tax on wealth they do not have 
to hand, it could lead to absurd results.  
Let us probe Kiker’s claim that the ‘capital’ valuation of labour-power could lead to ‘absurd 
results’ because workers do not have this wealth ‘to hand’. It is also possible that the owner of 
a factory and its machinery may not have ‘to hand’ money representing the estimated value of 
the owned assets. Yet Kiker suggested that the capitalist is advantaged in this respect, 
compared to the worker. Kiker is right, but he does not give the reason why. Both the 
capitalist and the worker own wealth in Farr’s sense, in the form of the discounted present 
value of the future income stream of their assets. The unspoken matter is that the capitalist can 
borrow money on the basis of the collateral in her owned factories or machines, but the 
worker has no such collateral.  
Why is it unfeasible for the worker to go to the bank and borrow on similar grounds as the 
capitalist? A bank may offer a limited loan on the basis of expected future earnings (as with 
some student bursary schemes), but such offers will be relatively limited unless the worker 
can offer collateral. For a loan approaching the present value of the future income stream, the 
banker would demand collateral to cover the risk of non-payment or of the future income 
being below expectations. The purpose of collateral is to safeguard the lender: if the loan is 
not repaid as agreed, then the banker can sue the defaulter, and force the sale or gain 
possession of collateralized assets if necessary. The crucial point is that factories and 
machines can serve as collateral on a loan, but the labour power of a wage-worker cannot. 
When the worker defaults on loan repayments she cannot sell the ‘wealth’ constituted by her 
future earnings, unless she sells herself into slavery. To avoid the ‘absurd’ outcome noted by 
Kiker, and restore the symmetry between the ‘wealth’ of the capitalist and the employee, the 
worker would have to be able to borrow money using her value as a slave as collateral. If the 
worker defaults on her repayments then she can be sold on the slave market to recover the 
debt. The symmetry in several respects would be restored, albeit at the cost of the worker’s 
freedom. But equality under the law blocks this option. This point was briefly acknowledged 
by one of the early human capital theorists. In a rare visitation of this issue, Schultz (1972, p. 
7) emphasized that 
human capital has some distinctive attributes. Whatever its form, it cannot be bought and 
sold except where men are slaves. Whereas material capital has the legal status of 
property, human capital is not ‘protected’ by this legal mantle, slavery aside. For 
example, the freedom of choice in acquiring educational capital is subject to the 
difference in the legal status of human rights and that of property. Since a person cannot 
indenture himself or enter into a contract that would encumber his human rights, it 
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follows that in the case of a loan to a student for his education, the lender’s property right 
in the capital funds that he transfers to the student cannot be covered by a mortgage on the 
student.  
Also Paul Samuelson (1976, p. 52) wrote in his famous textbook: 
Interestingly enough most of society’s economic income cannot be capitalized into 
private property. Since slavery was abolished, human earning power is forbidden by law 
to be capitalized. A man is not even free to sell himself: he must rent himself at a wage. 
But such statements are exceptional. Samuelson and Schultz got good marks for noting that 
labour power cannot be mortgaged, i.e. used as collateral. But they failed to note that the 
possibility of collateralization is a key part of the everyday usage of the word capital. If we 
can have ‘human capital’, then we have to find another word to describe collateralisable 
capital. But instead of dealing with these conceptual problems, the literature on ‘human 
capital’ moved on to address its own research program, oblivious to the conceptual limitations 
of treating ‘human capital’ alongside other ‘capital’ inputs as an array of arguments in a 
production function. The damage had been done.  
There are two important lessons in this story. First, vital to the everyday meaning of the 
word capital, is either money or the realizable money value of an asset. Realizable money 
value means that the asset can be used as collateral for securing a loan. Capital is money or 
money value, and it is tied up with the capitalist system of debt.  
Second, and consequently, it is a major error to apply the term capital in this sense to assets 
that are not money, do not have realizable money value, or only have a realizable money 
value under a non-capitalist economic system. Labour power comes in under the third option. 
Its full money value would be realizable under a system of slavery. Westgarth (1875, p. 64) 
was right but for the wrong reasons: ‘A slave is a definite marketable subject, and is capital, 
but a free agent is not.’  
The reader may object that we can define words as we wish, and the common usage among 
economists of capital is that of any productive asset. Fair enough. But given the importance of 
understanding money, debt and collateralization for even an elementary appreciation of the 
nature of capitalism, it is important to acknowledge that the ‘human capital’ of a waged 
worker is of a very different nature from the ‘capital’ owned by a capitalist. Both are assets 
but – as long as slavery is prohibited – only one can act as collateral. This crucial distinction 
gets lost if we extend the usage of the word capital, at least without adding qualifying terms 
that preserve the vital monetary meaning and its association with collateral and debt. After 
Smith, economists changed their conceptual toolkit in a way that made key features of the 
rising capitalist order invisible to their theory. That conceptual blindness has to be rectified in 
some way.  
Marshall freely acknowledged some of the differences between the selling of labour and the 
selling of goods. Marshall (1920, p. 569) noted that ‘when a person sells his services, he has 
to present himself where they are delivered. It matters nothing to the seller of bricks whether 
they are to be used in building a palace or a sewer: but it matters a great deal to the seller of 
labour.’ This is true and important. But Marshall failed to note that goods may be used as 
collateral, but the wage-labourer cannot mortgage his or her labour power.  
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Marxists have also fallen short on this issue.9  While they have generally avoided the term 
‘human capital’ they have done so because they also use the c-word to refer to a system of 
extracting surplus value from the workers, rather than to a mere input into the production 
process. But at the same time their own usage of the term ‘capital’, based on a downgrading 
of the legal phenomena of property, contract and debt, omits the key feature of monetary 
collateralization.10  
To answer the question that heads this section, humans can be capital, but only when they 
are slaves. Marx sometimes misleadingly remarked that workers under capitalism were slaves 
(Marx and Engels 1989, p. 91), but in Capital he put a different view (Marx 1976, p. 271). 
Mainstream economists adopted the term ‘human capital’ nevertheless. Neither Marx nor 
mainstream economists accented collateralization, and the consequent crucial difference 
between the property of a capitalist and that of a worker.  
3. ‘A plethora of capitals’  
If the word capital can apply to anything that helps production, then it can apply to a huge 
range of material and immaterial assets.11 ‘Natural capital’ appeared early on as an alternative 
term for land and mineral resources (Johnson 1909). But the flood came after the 1960s, 
prompted by the work by Schultz, Becker and others on ‘human capital’. It also inundated 
sociology. As James N. Baron and Michael T. Hannan (1994, p. 1123) noted: ‘a minor 
sociological industry’ arose ‘to construct sociological parallels to human capital’, giving rise 
to ‘a plethora of capitals’. In economics, sociology and related disciplines, this plethora now 
includes: 
‘natural capital’ (Johnson 1909),  
‘health capital’ (Grossman 1972), 
‘religious capital’ (Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975), 
‘linguistic and cultural capital’ and ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1977),  
‘reputational capital’ (Veljanovski and Whelan 1983),  
‘social capital’ (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1988, 1990, Putnam 1995), 
‘organizational capital’ (Tomer 1987, Klein 1988),  
‘academic capital’ (Bourdieu 1988),  
‘cultural or consumption capital’ (Becker and Murphy 1988),  
‘cognitive capital’ (Rescher 1989),  
‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1990),  
‘environmental capital’ (Hartwick 1991),  
‘self-command capital’ (Lindenberg 1993), 
                                                 
9 Nitzan and Bichler (2009) wrote repeatedly that “capital is power.” This is unsatisfactory, for several reasons. 
Power has a much longer history, so power cannot be the sole defining characteristic of capital.  They also 
deploy a flawed definition of power as “confidence in obedience” (p. 17). It would imply that an over-confident 
individual, deluded by the extent of her powers, was in fact powerful. Powerful people often become 
megalomaniacs, but megalomania itself is not power. More plausibly, they also wrote that: “Capital is … a 
capitalization of expected future earnings” (p. 211) and “the elements of corporate capitalization … represent … 
the power of a corporation’s owners” (p. 8). They declared: “All capital is finance and only finance” (p. 262).  
10 See Hodgson (2003, 2014) and Heinsohn and Steiger (2013) for discussions.   
11 Very early Germanic ventures in this direction were Roscher’s (1870, pp. 81-87) geistige Kapital (intellectual 
or spiritual capital) and the 1878 notion by Nietzsche (1996, p. 258) of Geist- und Willens-Kapital (capital of the 
spirit and will).  
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‘network capital’ (Sik 1994),  
‘personal capital’ (Dei Ottati 1994, Becker 1996),  
‘political, social and cultural capital’ (Mouzelis 1995),  
‘intellectual capital’ (Edvinsson and Malone 1997),  
‘resource capital and institutional capital’ (Oliver 1997), 
‘spiritual capital’ (Verter 2003),  
‘individual trust capital (relational capital)’ (Castelfranchi et al. 2006), 
‘collective trust capital’ (Castelfranchi et al. 2006),  
‘street capital’ (Sandberg and Pedersen 2009) and even 
‘erotic capital’ (Hakim 2011).  
Given this burgeoning literature and so many different manifestations, one would have 
difficulty in identifying what enduring entity or property is not some variety of capital. 
Capital has now acquired the broad meaning of a stock or reserve of anything of social or 
economic significance. Everything has become capital.  
Long divested of its monetary associations, economists had made it respectable to describe 
any unconsumed productive resource as capital. Now sociologists can earn academic 
reputations by discovering new forms of ‘capital’. Instead of critiquing each of the above 
terms, the next section focuses on the most popular, namely the remarkable rise of research 
into ‘social capital’. Several of the critical remarks that apply to this term apply to others on 
the above list.  
4. ‘Social capital’  
The term ‘social capital’ is found in all three volumes of Marx’s Capital and in Marshall’s 
Principles (Marx 1976, 1978, 1981, Marshall 1920). But in these contexts it had a different 
meaning: it referred to national aggregates of productive assets or wealth.12 As Fetter (1927, 
p. 156) remarked on Marshall’s usage: ‘Social capital is but a mischievous name for national 
wealth.’ 
But a different meaning was established when the American social reformer Lyda J. 
Hanifan (1916, p. 130) defined ‘social capital’ as ‘good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social 
intercourse among the individuals and families that make up a social unit’.13 This second 
meaning became widely adopted when French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986), Chicago 
sociologist James Coleman (1988, 1990) and political scientist Robert Putnam (1995, 2000) 
used ‘social capital’ to describe social obligations, ties or networks that create social cohesion 
and may promote economic development. This idea has proved enormously popular with 
major institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But to date 
there is no consensus among its advocates on a clear definition of the term. It is used to refer 
to multidimensional social attributes, such as frequencies of interaction in different contexts, 
participation levels in social organizations, level of trust, and so on.  
There is no doubt that social relations, networks and trust have economic effects. Indeed 
social ties and social rules are necessary for any society and its economy to function. But a 
                                                 
12 The term “public capital” appeared early in the nineteenth century (Anonymous 1819) and occasionally 
thereafter, but then the term clearly referred to money in the hands of the public. It acquired the current physical 
meaning of public infrastructure much later.  
13 Renan (1899) previously wrote: ‘An heroic past, great men and true glory are the social capital on which the 
idea of a nation is based.’  
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major issue of contention is whether they should be regarded as a form of capital. This is 
discussed later in this section.  
Another question is whether anything new had been discovered beneath the label. 
Sociologists had long investigated the nature and effects of such phenomena as networks, 
organizations and trust, but this research was often depicted by critics as soft and secondary. 
Then two leading sociologists adopted the term and its usage took off. It had a hard-edged 
economic feel, while suitably underlining the importance of the social.  
The term was so successful that it re-entered economics with its post-Bourdieu meaning. 
Economists had since the 1950s been worrying about their inability to account for much of 
economic growth using production functions with ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ as inputs. Their first 
reaction was to regard the unexplained residual as due to technological change. Then 
pioneering institutional economists such as Douglass North (1971) and Mancur Olson (1982) 
argued that different or changing institutions should also be taken into account.  
In the desperate search for missing ingredients to help explain economic growth, the ‘social 
capital’ label worked wonders. It had connotations of yet another measurable substance that 
might be put into a production function, as long as the problems of its definition, 
heterogeneity and measurability could be overcome. Extraordinarily successful in both 
disciplines, it was a marketing triumph.  
But ‘social capital’ shares problems of measurability with all other forms of capital, 
including ‘human capital’. These were revealed when the Cambridge (UK) side in the capital 
debates established the significance of the heterogeneity of ‘capital goods’ (Sraffa 1960, 
Harcourt 1972, Robinson 1979, Cohen and Harcourt 2003).  
Furthermore, the term ‘social capital’ has attracted the criticism of both mainstream and 
heterodox economists.14 But the problems inherent in the shift of meaning of ‘capital’ from 
money to things have been largely ignored. With the term ‘social capital’ these previous 
problems are greatly compounded. Consider some of the criticisms in more detail. Kenneth 
Arrow (1999, p. 4) wrote:  
The term ‘capital’ implies three aspects: (a) extension in time; (b) deliberate sacrifice in 
the present for future benefit; and (c) alienability. The last is not true for human capital 
and not even entirely true for [irreversible] physical investment … But it is especially (b) 
that fails. The essence of social networks is that they are built up for reasons other than 
their economic value to the participants …  
Arrow here attempted to set out three characteristics of capital and measure ‘social capital’ 
against them. While he rejected ‘social capital’, his critique is flawed. The first characteristic 
(a) clearly applies to social capital as well, so it is unhelpful. Misleadingly, he claimed that the 
third characteristic (c) of alienability does not apply to ‘human capital’. He overlooked that 
‘human capital’ can be sold when it consists of slaves. And his claim that some forms of 
physical investment cannot in principle be sold is perplexing. Many irreversible or immobile 
investments can indeed be sold.  
Arrow mentioned the non-alienability (the inability to sell) ‘social capital’ but failed to give 
it sufficient weight. To do this he would also have to reject the concept of ‘human capital’, 
which is not generally alienable (at least with wage-labour). Failing to reject this too, he had 
                                                 
14 See Arrow (1999), Bowles (1999), Solow (1999), Baron, Field and Schuller (2000), Fine (2001), Knorringa 
and van Staveren (2007).  
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to downgrade the importance of alienability. Instead he ended up stressing the second point 
(b) concerning ‘deliberate sacrifice for future benefit’. Clearly, most of what is described as 
‘social capital’ is not built up deliberately. But if a country were to follow the advice of the 
World Bank and others, and aim to build up its ‘social capital’ with an eye to improving 
national economic performance, then Arrow’s formulation would suggest that it had also 
become a form of capital. His emphasis on the second criterion is unconvincing. He should 
have put more stress on the third, while abandoning the concepts of ‘human’ as well as 
‘social’ capital.  
Robert Solow (1999, p. 6) saw ‘social capital’ as ‘an attempt to gain conviction from a bad 
analogy.’ He then wrote: 
Generically ‘capital’ stands for a stock of produced or natural factors of production that 
can be expected to yield productive services for some time. Originally anyone who talked 
about capital had in mind a stock of tangible, solid, often durable things such as buildings, 
machinery and inventories. 
This additionally implies a rejection of the concept of ‘human capital’. Labour power is 
neither generally ‘tangible’ nor ‘solid’. Solow reverted to a physical concept of capital that 
has some resemblance to notions in Marx and Marshall, but his exclusion of labour or skill 
from the category of capital gives it an even narrower meaning than that of Smith. Solow (p. 
9) concluded: ‘I do not see how dressing this set of issues in the language and apparatus of 
capital theory helps much one way or the other.’ But his criticisms were inadequate. By 
claiming that originally ‘capital’ for ‘anyone’ meant physical assets, Solow seemed unaware 
of its persistent meaning outside economics.  
In his critique of ‘social capital’, Samuel Bowles (1999, p. 6) wrote: 
‘Capital’ refers to a thing possessed by individuals; even a social isolate like Robinson 
Crusoe had an axe and a fishing net. By contrast, the attributes said to make up social 
capital – such as trust, commitment to others, adhering to social norms and punishing 
those who violate them – describe relationships among people.  
But even here there are problems. What is important about capital is not possession but legal 
rights of ownership: he seemed to conflate the two. He also created problems by overlooking 
the legal and financial institutions required to sustain capital, alongside an unhelpful reference 
to Robinson Crusoe. He rightly alluded to questions of alienability, but weakened their punch 
by treating capital as things. Bowles was right to state that ‘social capital’ concerns social 
relations. But he also needed to focus more specifically on the historically-specific social 
relations associated with ‘capital’, more narrowly defined.  
Economists and sociologists have vastly widened the meaning of capital. Leading 
economists such as Arrow, Bowles and Solow thought that ‘social capital’ was a step too far. 
But Mitchell Innes, Fetter, Schumpeter and others argued more acutely that the problems with 
the over-stretched capital concept derive from the abandonment of its long-lasting (and still-
current) monetary meaning. These difficulties are compounded with the imprecise concept of 
‘social capital’. Unlike machines, land and slaves, it cannot be owned, borrowed, bought or 
sold.  Consequently, it is difficult to give it a meaningful price. Crucially, because of its 
intrinsic elusiveness and the impossibility of owning or selling it, ‘social capital’ cannot be 
used as collateral in order to borrow money.  
The broadened usages of the term ‘capital’ overlook the key differences. Partly because of 
unwarranted conflation of different public and academic meanings, policies designed to build 
up ‘social capital’ may employ a spurious methodology of measurability, and may incline 
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with inadequate justification towards price-based or market instruments. Social scientists 
should consider returning to less glamorous but much more useful terms such as ‘institutions’, 
‘culture’, ‘networks’, and ‘trust’.  
5. Summary and possible conclusions  
Both classical and neoclassical economists adopted ontologies where economic value was 
seen as deriving from physical activities, substances or sensations, such as embodied labour 
time or utility (Mirowski 1989, Orléan 2011).15 Agents came in as possessors or controllers of 
these things or substances. More specific legal rights over property, such as the rights to 
alienate or use as collateral, were downplayed. Instead of money, or owned and alienable 
assets that are convertible into money, capital came to mean anything lasting, which 
contributes to the production of goods or services. With the exception of Marx, ‘capital’ was 
no longer regarded as a historically specific and monetary phenomenon, associated with the 
capitalist epoch. 
Money confounds this classical and neoclassical picture. Money concerns mutual 
understandings and individual interactions, played out on a register of symbols or material 
representations (Searle 1995). According to the commonplace business view, capital is either 
money or the money value of alienable property. This view involves legal rights and 
institutions, as well as agent-object relations.  
Prominent different usages of the word ‘capital’ and possible attributes of different forms of 
‘capital’ are summarized in Table 1. The four kinds of ‘capital’ considered are (a) capital as 
money or collateral, (b) ‘capital goods’, (c) ‘human capital’, and (d) ‘social capital’.  
Each of these four kinds is considered in regard to five criteria: (1) Can its use-rights (i.e. 
usus or usus fructus rights) be owned or hired? (2) Has this form of capital a price formed in 
the market for capital of this type? (3) Can this kind of capital be used as collateral to borrow 
money? (4) Can this kind of capital be sold with all rights of ownership transferred to the 
purchaser? (5) Is the value of this kind of capital measurable? These five criteria are self-
evidently important in economic terms, and reveal major differences between the different 
types of ‘capital’.  
  
                                                 
15 André Orléan (2011, p. 12) wrote: “la valeur marchande n’est pas une substance … qui préexiste aux 
échanges. Il faut plutôt la considérer comme une création sui generis des rapports marchands.” (Translation: 
“market value is not a substance ... that predates trade. Rather it must be considered as a sui generis creation of 
market relations.”) 
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 Types of ‘Capital’ 
 Capital (as finance 
or collateral)  
‘Capital Goods’ 
(as physical 
factors of 
production) 
‘Human Capital’ ‘Social Capital’ 
First prominent users 
of the idea or concept 
Medieval Italian 
capitalists 
A. Smith  
had the idea 
A. Smith  
had the idea 
L. Hanifan  
had the idea and 
used the term 
Social scientists who 
promoted the term in 
the designated manner 
J. A. Hobson  
W. Sombart 
M. Weber 
A. Mitchell Innes 
J. A. Schumpeter 
J. B. Clark I. Fisher G. S. Becker 
T. W. Schultz 
P. Bourdieu 
J. Coleman 
Can the use-rights be 
owned or hired? Yes Yes Yes No 
Has it a market price? Yes Yes – in many cases 
Wage-labour 
allows a price for 
use-rights only 
No 
Can it be used as 
collateral? Yes Yes 
No – except in the 
case of slaves No 
Can it be bought or 
sold (alienated)? Yes Yes 
No – except in the 
case of slaves  No 
Is it readily 
measurable in the 
aggregate? 
Yes No –  except by assuming a list of 
relevant prices 
No – except by 
assuming a list of 
relevant wages 
No 
 
Table 1. Meanings of ‘Capital’ and their Attributes 
 
 
The table dramatizes the contrasts between different kinds of ‘capital’, with the most 
extreme divergence being between ‘social capital’ and money-oriented capital. The contrast 
between ‘human capital’ and money-oriented capital is also striking. Significant but less 
dramatic are the differences between ‘capital goods’ and money-oriented capital. Remarkably, 
the entire Cambridge capital controversy (Sraffa 1960, Harcourt 1972, Robinson 1979, Cohen 
and Harcourt 2003) focused in the lowest box in the ‘capital goods’ column. While 
mainstream economists had treated capital as a substance, the Cambridge (UK) critics 
emphasized the heterogeneity of ‘capital goods’. Their value can be measured by assuming a 
price or other vector of evaluation, and then aggregating according to that metric. But because 
such a measure has to be assumed at the outset, there is no viable measure of ‘capital goods’ 
that is independent of distribution or prices. This is an important point, but it is confined to 
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one single cell in the table. The Cambridge (UK) critics also pointed to the unwarranted 
conflation of capital goods with money-oriented capital, which had been previously criticized 
by Veblen (1908a, pp. 185-6; 1908d, pp. 121-2).  
But Table 1 does not complete the argument. It reveals weaknesses in the concepts of 
‘human capital’ and ‘social capital’. Dealing with ‘capital goods’ is trickier, as it qualifies 
affirmatively on all but one criterion. The key question is what usage of the term capital is 
legitimate? Of course there is no strict rule here because there is no law against trying to make 
words mean anything we wish.  
We have a choice. We can follow the trend in economics and sociology and regard capital 
as any relatively durable thing or attribute that leads to the satisfaction of wants. Marxism 
offers a variant on this first definition by narrowing capital to productive factors under 
circumstances where workers do not own the material means of production. A third option is 
to follow Hobson, Sombart, Weber, Mitchell Innes, Fetter, and Schumpeter and return to the 
meaning of capital that emerged in Europe by the thirteenth century in the context of trading 
and investment, and persists in business usage today. Capital is then defined as a fund of 
money to be invested in some enterprise. 
Consider six reasons for confining the meaning of capital, to money investible in 
production, or to the money value of owned, alienable, collateralisable assets that are 
employed in production. This means rejecting the terms ‘human capital’ (except in relation to 
slavery) and ‘social capital’. The term ‘capital goods’ can be retained only if its meaning is 
changed from a factor of production, to goods that that can be used as collateral. The reasons 
are as follows.  
First, capitalism is arguably a historically specific type of system where capital plays a 
dominant role. Marx, Weber, Hobson, Sombart and Schumpeter all saw capitalism as existing 
from around the seventeenth or eighteenth century. All other forms of ‘capital’ have a much 
greater longevity. Much of what goes under descriptions of ‘social capital’ – such as networks 
and trust – can be found in the primates. If ‘human capital’ means any learned capacity for 
labour, then this would go back to adults teaching children to make fire. With ‘capital goods’ 
the use of stone tools by humanoids stretches back millions of years. By contrast, even if we 
regard the loans of the temple-banks of Mesopotamia as capital, then the history of money-
oriented capital is merely about five thousand years. We could even go further and confine 
capital to the second millennium AD, noting its emergence in some Italian city states. Then 
the life of capital is less than a one-thousandth of ‘social capital’, ‘human capital’ or ‘capital 
goods’. If we consider its developed lifetime to begin in Britain around 1700, then there is an 
even greater contrast with its supposedly kindred concepts. Wherever the joints are carved, 
capital (defined in terms of money) is much more historically specific than its purported 
relatives, and hence is much more useful in identifying capital-ism.    
Second, if we choose to allow capital to be used in more ways than its monetary meaning, 
and to apply to other phenomena, then we need another word to describe its important, 
commonplace, and historically relevant monetary form. Perhaps we might instead use the 
terms ‘money capital’ or ‘finance capital’? But then we would have to describe the system as 
money-capitalism or finance-capitalism. Both would falsely allude to another more basic type 
of capitalism, when we are trying to describe the species as a whole. Alternatives such as 
‘collateralisable capital’ are perhaps too ungainly. This leaves us with the more radical 
solution: to confine capital solely to its everyday monetary meaning.  
Third, the conjunction of the word ‘capital’ to a large variety of very different phenomena 
has been at the cost of a large amount of relevant meaning. ‘Social capital’ overturns the 
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commonplace usage of capital. Very serious problems remain with ‘human capital’. Huge 
problems have been caused by the conflation of ‘capital goods’ with money-oriented capital. 
These problems arise with such extensions of meaning.  
Fourth, all words bring their own baggage. Much of this baggage is ideological. Although 
good economists keep a sharp lookout for ideological biases, the wider public with which 
economists interact is less well trained. Theories get distorted into statements of ideology. 
Hence given the previous prominent designation of ‘capital’ as a pecuniary phenomenon, 
combined with the prevalence of an ideology regarding markets as the universal solution to 
economic and social problems, the promiscuous associations of ‘capital’ can give the 
impression that all political, cultural, social, cognitive and ecological phenomena can be 
valued and traded in monetary terms, and invested like finance capital. The inference may be 
drawn that everything labelled as ‘capital’ is tradable, and has a price. For example, terms 
such as ‘environmental capital’ or ‘natural capital’ may delude politicians and policy-makers 
that all environmental assets can be, and indeed need to be, valued properly in price terms. 
They then seek expert and well-paid economists to carry out the pecuniary evaluations. But 
giving something a price is not the same thing as establishing the possibility of ownership and 
alienability. There many things – like love, trust and honour – that cannot be readily traded, 
and do not have a meaningful or appropriate price (Fox 1974, Walzer 1983, Ellerman 1992, 
Satz 2010, Sandel 2012). At least in part, nature may become a money-valued object of 
ownership and a source of pecuniary gain. But seeking maximum profits is not necessarily the 
same thing as securing ecological sustainability (Krall and Gowdy 2012). The term ‘natural 
capital’ obscures this crucial difference.  
Fifth, issue of collateral, inherent in the monetary definition of capital, helps to highlight a 
key difference between the assets owned by a capitalist and the labour power owned by a 
worker. The capitalist can use her assets as collateral and borrow more money to invest in 
further ventures, hence getting a double usage out of these assets. By contrast, the worker 
cannot use her labour power as collateral. This illuminates an important aspect of class 
inequality with capitalism. A major source of capitalism’s inequalities of income and wealth 
becomes capital itself.  
Finally, especially after the Great Crash of 2008, it is time for all economists of whatever 
stripe to reconsider their ideas. Economists have not managed to fit money into their highest 
most general and most prestigious theory (Hahn 1965, 1987, 1988). Most of academic 
monetary economics exhibits a ‘steadfast refusal to face facts’ (Goodhart 2009) or an 
‘unfortunate uselessness’ (Buiter 2009), to quote the words of two leading monetary 
economists. We need to sweep with a new broom. We should consider using the terminology 
of capital that prevails in the real business world. Instead of ‘capital goods’ we may use the 
broader term ‘capital assets’, signifying the importance of immaterial or intangible, as well as 
material, property. Instead of ‘human capital’ why not ‘human resources’? And instead of 
‘social capital’, why not ‘networks’ or ‘social trust’? Capital then becomes more meaningful 
and special.16  
                                                 
16 In accord with this view, Piketty (2014) defines capital to include cash, bonds, and shares, collateralizable 
assets such as buildings, land, machinery, and intellectual property, but excludes social capital and non-slave 
human capital. With data based on this definition he makes important claims concerning the drivers of economic 
inequality.  
 - 20 - 
The other option is to leave things as they are. Marxist and mainstream economists may 
take the view that their approaches are sufficiently robust. But perhaps the time is ripe to 
question some fundamental terms.  
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